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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Reply to Appellee's Additional Undisputed and Material Facts-
Appellant Premier Van Schaack Realty, Inc. ("Premier") replies as follows to the 
statement of Additional Undisputed and Material Facts in the Brief of Appellee 
("Appellee's Brief) of Thomas K. Sieg ("Sieg"): 
S ieg's Paragraph 4. The cited pages of the record do not support Sieg's 
assertion that, "[throughout the operating term of MJTM, Mr. Sieg paid the three (3) other 
members a salary for their personal services to the venture." Rather, Sieg testified in his 
deposition that certain relatives of the other members of MJTM, LLC ("MJTM") were hired 
by MJTM to install certain items, such as flooring and lighting. See R. at 85. Of course, the 
MJTM, LLC Operating Agreement (the "Operating Agreement" beginning at R. at 122) 
provided that the managers of MJTM, including Sieg, were each entitled to a salary for their 
work as managers in the amount of $25,000 per year. R. at 143. 
Sieg's Paragraph 8. In paragraph 8, Sieg states that "[i]t was the 
understanding of the members of MJTM that MJTM did not purchase the property from Mr. 
Sieg nor exchange anything for the property." Sieg supports this assertion with a statement 
in an affidavit from only one of the four members of MJTM, not the members as a whole. 
Further, the understanding of one of the members of MJTM as to the legal effect of the 
transaction involving the conveyance by Sieg of the Wolf Mansion located at 273 North 
East Capital, Salt Lake City, Utah (the "Property") to MJTM is irrelevant. 
Sieg's Paragraph 9. Sieg's statement in paragraph 9 that "Sieg did not, in 
fact, receive any compensation for his capital contribution, nor was he relieved of any debt 
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at any time" is a legal conclusion that is contradicted by the terms of the Operating 
Agreement, as well as the undisputed fact that MJTM arranged for a loan from Zions First 
National Bank ("Zions") to be used to convert the Wolf Mansion located at 273 North 
East Capital, Salt Lake City, Utah (the "Property") into a "bed and breakfast" and that 
$300,000 of that loan was used to pay off the $300,000 loan in Sieg's name secured by a 
lien on the Property. See Brief of Appellant ("Appellant's Brief) at 9, f 8. 
Sieg's Paragraph 10. To the extent they are relevant, Mr. Ayers' opinions 
are more appropriately contained in the argument section of the Appellee's Brief. In 
paragraph 10, Mr. Ayers gives his opinion on the ultimate issues in this case, supported 
only by his experience as a real estate agent and broker, and with no legal support. 
Further, Mr. Ayers does not indicate that he has had any experience with real estate 
transactions involving a Utah limited liability company (an "L.L.C."). With all due 
respect to Mr. Ayers, it is the province of this Court to make the ultimate legal 
conclusions based on the arguments presented by the attorneys and the facts in the record. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The heart of the dispute on appeal is whether Sieg received consideration for his 
conveyance of the Property to MJTM. If Sieg received consideration for his conveyance 
of the Property to MJTM, he is obligated to pay Premier its brokerage fee based on a 
percentage of the "price" or consideration received, as provided in the Listing Agreement 
and Agency Disclosure dated February 7, 1997 between Sieg and Coldwell Banker 
Premier Realty, predecessor-in-interest to Premier (the "Listing Agreement" beginning at 
R. at 109). 
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Sieg received consideration as provided in the Operating Agreement and as part of 
the actual transaction in which Sieg conveyed the Property to MJTM. In the Operating 
Agreement, MJTM agreed to assume $580,000 in debt owed by Sieg, and Sieg received 
an initial balance in his capital account of $670,000. In the event of dissolution prior to 
profitability, Sieg was to receive repayment of his initial capital contribution prior to 
distribution to the other members. Further, the Operating Agreement provides that 
MJTM could not pledge or encumber any of its assets without Sieg's consent so long as 
Sieg's initial capital contribution remained unpaid. Accordingly, repayment of Sieg's 
initial capital contribution was secured by a negative pledge of the Property, junior only 
to the loan from Zions used to remodel the Property. 
Further, the Operating Agreement provided Sieg a percentage interest in MJTM 
and a 9% preferential return on his initial capital contribution. These also were 
negotiated benefits that Sieg received as provided in the Operating Agreement. In the 
Appellee's Brief, Sieg impliedly admitted that there was adequate consideration provided 
in the Operating Agreement when he stated he "was obligated by the terms of the 
Operating Agreement to contribute the [Pjroperty to MJTM." Appellee's Brief at 5. 
If there is any question regarding the adequacy of the consideration provided for in 
the Operating Agreement, that question is answered when Sieg conveyed the Property to 
MJTM as part of a loan transaction intended to effectuate the purpose of MJTM, as 
expressed in the Operating Agreement, to renovate the Property into a "bed and 
breakfast." Sieg conveyed the Property to MJTM to complete MJTM's loan transaction 
with Zions, and as part of that transaction, $300,000 from the new Zions loan was used to 
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pay off a $300,000 loan owed by Sieg encumbering the Property. The funds from the 
Zions loan were used by MJTM to convert the Property into a "bed and breakfast/' which 
MJTM completed in just over one year. Thereafter, Sieg bought out the other members 
of MJTM, two for $30,000 each, and sold the Property to the Malones. R. at 104-06. 
There was consideration for Sieg's conveyance of the Property to MJTM - Sieg 
bargained for certain rights and benefits and Sieg received what he bargained for. 
Sieg's conveyance of the Property to MJTM constituted a "sale or exchange" 
under the terms of the Listing Agreement because Sieg conveyed the Property to a 
limited liability company, a separate person or entity, and received valuable 
consideration. Premier was not an insurer of the success of Sieg's chosen venture, and 
was not deprived of its right to its brokerage fee based upon the risk of decrease in value 
of the consideration given to Sieg for the conveyance of the Property to MJTM. 
Sieg conveyed the Property to MJTM and received the bargained for 
consideration. MJTM's stated purpose was to renovate the Property into a first rate "bed 
and breakfast" and to operate it for a profit. MJTM completed the renovation, but before 
it could operate the Property for a profit, Sieg bought out the other members of MJTM 
and sold the Property to the Malones. 
For the first time, in the Appellee's Brief, Sieg argues that the agreed value of the 
Property as stated in the Operating Agreement is not an appropriate basis from which to 
calculate the brokerage fee due to Premier. In Sieg's Memorandum in Response to 
Plaintiffs Request for Summary Judgment and in Support of Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment (the "Opposition Memo"), Sieg admitted that the agreed value of the 
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Property in the Operating Agreement was $1.3 million, and Sieg did not dispute that the 
7% brokerage fee is appropriately calculated using that agreed value. See R. at 237. 
Based on the record as presented to the trial court, Premier is entitled to $91,000, plus 
$250, plus prejudgment interest, costs and attorneys' fees 
The Court should reverse the trial court's award of attorneys' fees in favor of Sieg. 
In the Appellee's Brief, Sieg admits that he failed to satisfy the requirements of Rule 4-
505(1) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. Those requirements are mandatory, 
and set the minimum evidence that a trial court must receive in order to evaluate and 
make an attorneys' fees award. The trial court abused its discretion in making the award 
in favor of Sieg when Sieg had failed to provide it with the minimum evidence required. 
This Court should reverse the ruling of the district court, and should remand to the 
district court with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Premier for $91,250 (or 
$87,500 in the event the court chooses to consider Sieg's new argument and to apply the 
method outlined in Hagan), plus prejudgment interest, plus reasonable attorneys' fees and 
costs, in an amount to be determined by the district court. 
ARGUMENT 
As shown in the Appellant's Brief and the Appellee's Brief, the facts are largely 
undisputed. Sieg conveyed the Property to MJTM during the term of the exclusive 
Listing Agreement. In the Appellee's Brief, Sieg admits that he breached the Listing 
Agreement. Appellee's Brief at 30-31. But Sieg argues that, because the rights he 
received in the transaction in which he conveyed the Property to MJTM constituted a 
risky investment, he is not required to pay Premier's brokerage fee agreed in the Listing 
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Agreement. See Appellee's Brief at 10-27. The heart of the dispute on appeal is whether 
Sieg received consideration for his conveyance of the Property to MJTM. Under the 
terms of the Listing Agreement, Sieg was obligated to pay Premier its agreed fee in the 
event he conveyed the Property to another during the term of the Listing Agreement for 
any consideration, with the fee being based on the agreed consideration or "price" 
received. 
Sieg acknowledges that he was a party to the Operating Agreement, and that 
pursuant to the Operating Agreement, Sieg was to convey the Property to MJTM and in 
exchange MJTM was to assume $580,000 in debts owed by Sieg and Sieg was to receive 
an initial balance in his MJTM capital account of $670,000 with a promised 9% priority 
return on his initial capital contribution, and a 40% interest in MJTM. R. at 128, 130-32, 
138, 173. In the Appellee's Brief, Sieg states that he "was obligated by the terms of the 
Operating Agreement to contribute the [PJroperty to MJTM." Appellee's Brief at 5. Of 
course, it is basic contract law that Sieg would only have been obligated to contribute the 
Property to MJTM if the Operating Agreement provided adequate consideration to 
support that obligation. See Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock 
Co., 706 P.2d 1028, 1036 (Utah 1985). 
Whether or not the express terms of the Operating Agreement provided adequate 
consideration to support Sieg's obligation to convey the Property to MJTM, Sieg did not 
convey the Property to MJTM until MJTM arranged for a loan from Zions First National 
Bank ("Zions") to effectuate the purposes of the Operating Agreement. The Zions loan 
was used to develop the Property into a "bed and breakfast" as contemplated by the 
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Operating Agreement, see R. at 130, and was secured with a first deed of trust on the 
Property. To complete the transaction, Sieg conveyed the Property to MJTM. The new 
Zions loan in the name of MJTM paid off the loan then owed by Sieg and secured with a 
lien on the Property. Each of the members of MJTM signed a guaranty agreement, 
guaranteeing repayment of the new loan from Zions.1 
Thereafter, MJTM utilized the proceeds from the new Zions loan to turn the 
Property into a "bed and breakfast," which it worked on for over a year and ultimately 
completed. After the remodel was successfully completed, Sieg bought out the interests 
of the other members of MJTM, two for $30,000 each, and sold the Property to the 
Malones. Sieg argues that the other members of MJTM contributed nothing to MJTM 
because they initially contributed their expertise and involvement rather than cash or 
assets. If the other members of MJTM contributed nothing to MJTM, Sieg would not 
have agreed to the rights they were provided in the Operating Agreement, and Sieg would 
not have paid two of the members $30,000 each to purchase their interests in MJTM. 
In light of these undisputed facts, it is beyond dispute that Sieg conveyed the 
Property to MJTM for adequate consideration, and Sieg is obligated to pay Premier its 
1
 Sieg's argument that he received no valuable consideration from MJTM because the 
other members of MJTM did not undertake a personal obligation, or personally assume, 
Sieg's debts that were assumed by MJTM ignores the realities of the transaction. Also, 
Sieg's characterization that Sieg's "purchase mortgage was merely subsumed by the 
construction loan so Zions would be in a first position, and should the loan be called due, 
MJTM's only chargeable asset to the creditor would remain the capital contribution of 
Mr. Sieg," Appellee's Brief at 13, n.3, is contrary to the facts. MJTM's loan from Zions 
was used to pay off $300,000 in debt owed by Sieg, and each member of MJTM 
guaranteed the MJTM loan from Zions. In the event Zions called the loan, Zions could 
look to all the assets of MJTM, including the improvements purchased with the loan, as 
well as the unencumbered assets of the guarantors. 
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agreed brokerage fee as provided in the Listing Agreement. This Court should reverse 
the ruling of the district court, and remand with instructions to the district court to enter 
judgment in favor of Premier for its brokerage fee in the amount of $91,250, plus 
prejudgment interest at 10% per annum from January 21, 1998 to the date of judgment, 
plus Premier's reasonable costs and attorneys' fees, including attorneys' fees on appeal. 
I. SIEG RECEIVED CONSIDERATION FOR HIS CONVEYANCE OF THE 
PROPERTY TO MJTM. 
An analysis of the one case cited on this appeal with comparable facts to this case, 
and which considered the precise question before this Court demonstrates that, based on 
the sound reasoning of the court in Hagan v. Adams Prop. Assocs., 253 Va. 217, 219-20, 
482 S.E.2d 805, 807 (Va. 1997), Sieg unquestionably and as a matter of law received 
consideration for his transfer of the Property to MJTM. As already discussed, in Hagan, 
an owner of real property subject to an exclusive listing agreement formed a new limited 
liability company during the term of the listing agreement and conveyed the property to 
the new L.L.C. When sued for a commission on the transfer of the real property, the 
former owner, like Sieg in this case, argued that capitalization of a new venture should 
not be classified as a sale of property, and argued, "the transfer did not constitute a sale 
because he did not receive any present valuable consideration for his contribution." Id. at 
219, 482 S.E.2d at 807. The court found that the L.L.C.'s agreement to assume the debt 
secured by the property, and a note given by the L.L.C. to the former owner as part of the 
property transfer transaction secured by a second deed of trust on the property constituted 
valid consideration. Id. at 219-20, 482 S.E.2d at 807. 
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In a strained attempt to distinguish Hagan, Sieg argues "Hagan is not helpful 
unless one examines the operating agreement . . . . If HPT had assets other than Hagan's 
capital contribution, or the operating agreement set forth an obligation on the other 
members to transfer assets, or the other members personally assumed the debt in the 
operating agreement, then it would have provided Hagan real debt relief." Appellee's 
Brief at 12. But the Hagan court made clear that its decision was based on none of these 
factors. Rather, the Hagan court stated that, "[e]ven assuming [the L.L.C. was not 
substituted in place of Hagan on the first deed of trust note], Hagan nevertheless received 
substantial relief from his debt obligation because, upon assuming all liabilities on the 
property, HPT became liable to Hagan for any amount Hagan would have had to pay the 
holder of the first deed of trust note." Hagan, 253 Va. at 219, 482 S.E.2d at 807. Despite 
the limited liability of members of an L.L.C, the Hagan court found that the L.L.C.'s 
assumption of Hagan's debt was part of his consideration. Id. at 219-20, 482 S.E.2d at 
807. 
But in this case, Sieg received something more than just MJTM's agreement to 
assume $580,000 of Sieg's debt. Of that amount, $300,000 was paid with the new loan 
MJTM obtained from Zions. To avoid the obvious conclusion that the payment of the 
$300,000 loan constituted consideration beyond any dispute, Sieg argues that the Zions 
loan is "irrelevant to whether consideration existed in the Operating Agreement three and 
one-half months earlier." Appellee's Brief at 5. Sieg continues that "the time of 
conveyance is immaterial because Mr. Sieg was obligated to convey in the Operating 
Agreement almost four months earlier, and any consideration for the conveyance must 
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necessarily have been set forth in the Operating Agreement." Id. This argument might 
have had some relevance if Sieg had not conveyed the Property to MJTM and Premier 
were claiming the right to its brokerage fee based on the fact that Sieg was bound to 
convey the Property in the Operating Agreement and refused. See, e.g., Curtis v. 
Mortensen, 267 P.2d 237, 239 (Utah 1954) (broker is entitled to commission when he has 
procured written binding offer or agreement even if seller changes mind); Boyer Co. v. 
Lignell, 567 P.2d 1112, 1114 (Utah 1977) (broker is entitled to commission when terms 
are agreed between parties). But such is not the case because Sieg did convey the 
Property to MJTM. 
Further, Sieg impliedly admits in his argument that there was adequate 
consideration provided by the terms of the Operating Agreement. Sieg would only have 
been "obligated to convey in the Operating Agreement almost four months earlier" if 
there was adequate consideration provided in the Operating Agreement for the 
conveyance. If that is the case, Sieg's obligation to pay Premier's brokerage fee was 
supported by consideration, and the Court need look no further than the Operating 
Agreement to find Sieg's obligation to pay Premier its brokerage commission. 
On the other hand, if there is any question that Sieg's conveyance of the Property 
to MJTM was supported by consideration, Sieg conveyed the Property to MJTM in order 
to conclude the loan transaction between MJTM and Zions in which Zions loaned MJTM 
$1,413 million secured by a first lien deed of trust on the Property, and $300,000 of those 
loan funds were used to pay off the loan owed by Sieg which was secured by a lien on the 
Property. Although Sieg argues that the other members of MJTM added nothing to the 
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L.L.C. as discussed above,2 the other members each signed a guaranty agreement in 
connection with the Zions loan, and were thus personally obligated. 
Finally, Sieg attempts to distinguish the Hagan case based on the "guaranteed 
second deed of trust which the seller received from the limited liability company (CHPT) 
in the amount of $323,000." Appellee's Brief at 11. The Hagan case does not indicate 
that the note given to Hagan by HPT was "guaranteed," but Hagan did receive a 
$323,000 note from the L.L.C. secured by a second deed of trust on the property Hagan 
conveyed to the L.L.C, which the court found constituted part of the consideration 
Hagan received for his conveyance of the property to the L.L.C. Hagan, 253 Va. at 219-
20, 482 S.E.2d at 807. Hagan argued that the second deed of trust note should not have 
been considered part of the consideration or the gross sales amount "because it was not 
due until the property was sold and was subordinate to the first deed of trust note and 
future development loans." Id. at 221, 482 S.E.2d at 808. The Hagan court concluded 
that the second trust deed note provided consideration because the note, due upon sale of 
the property, had priority over most anyone else, and "was part of the agreement 
surrounding the transfer of ownership of the property and represented a portion of the 
amount Hagan was willing to accept for the property." Id. at 219, 221, 482 S.E.2d at 808. 
Sieg received a comparable benefit in the Operating Agreement in connection with his 
conveyance of the Property. 
This argument is contradicted by the fact that Sieg bought out the interests of the other 
members, two for $30,000 each, prior to selling the Property to the Malones. See R. at 
104-06. 
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As Sieg has repeated pointed out, if MJTM were "dissolved for any reason prior to 
becoming profitable, Mr. Sieg's capital contribution would be returned to hiim 
undisturbed by any interest of the other members of MJTM." Appellee's Brief at 7, ^ ||8. 
Further, the Operating Agreement provided that MJTM could not grant "any mortgage, 
trust deed, security interest, lien or any other encumbrance affecting any real or personal 
property owned by" MJTM without Sieg's consent prior to Sieg receiving a distribution 
equal to his initial capital contribution. R. at 139, Operating Agreement § 9.2, R. at 138, 
Operating Agreement § 8.1(B). This type of provision is normally referred to as a 
negative pledge.3 
Although a negative pledge does not involve customary enforcement remedies and 
certain other attributes of a typical trust deed, the practical effect is the same, and a 
negative pledge provides consideration. A negative pledge is "an agreement to forbefrr 
from" encumbering the Property. See In re Continental Resources Corp., 43 B.R. 658, 
662 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1984), affd, 799 F.2d 622 (10th Cir. 1986). "Promises made % 
a party pursuant to a bilateral contract to do an act or to forbear from doing an act that 
would be detrimental to the promisor or beneficial to the promisee may constitute 
consideration for the other's promise." Resource Management Co., 706 P.2d at 1036 
(emphasis added). MJTM's negative pledge would be both a detriment to MJTM and| a 
benefit to Sieg. MJTM was prevented from encumbering the Property without Sieg's 
consent in order to obtain loan proceeds from other sources. Given that Sieg was granted 
3
 See Peter F. Coogan, Homer Kripke & Fredric Weiss, The Outer Fringes of Article 9: 
Subordination Agreements, Interests in Money and Deposits, Negative Pledge Clauses, 
and Participation Agreements, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 229, 263-65 (1965). 
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the right to prevent any further encumbrance against the Property, when the Property was 
sold and the L.L.C. dissolved, Sieg would have received payment of his initial capital 
contribution of $670,000, and that payment would have had priority over payments to 
anyone other than Zions, the beneficiary of the first deed of trust, which received its 
security interest with Sieg's consent. Sieg's "security" is the assurance "that 
unencumbered assets would be available in the event of default" of MJTM's obligation to 
return Sieg his initial capital contribution when the Property was sold. See In re Friese, 
28 B.R. 953, 955 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1983). Sieg received consideration for his 
conveyance of the Property to MJTM, and he is obligated to pay Premier its agreed 
brokerage fee. 
Even Sieg's agreed preferential return on his initial capital investment and his 
agreed percentage interest in MJTM given in exchange for his conveyance of the 
Property to MJTM provided consideration because MJTM impliedly promised to use its 
best efforts to be profitable and to provide the services necessary to become a profitable 
venture, as discussed in the Appellant's Brief. In response, Sieg argues that his 
conveyance of the Property was "in effect a gift ... and no consideration was exchanged." 
Appellee's Brief at 16. Sieg argues that he compensated the other members of MJTM for 
their work in converting the Property into a "bed and breakfast," "just as he would have 
compensated independent contractors for their services." Appellee's Brief at 16. 
4
 The record reflects that the other members of MJTM hired family members to do some 
of the work on the Property. R. at 85. 
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Regardless of Sieg's contortion and mischaracterization of the facts, the true nature of the 
transaction involving his conveyance of the Property to MJTM is clear. 
Sieg did not convey the Property to MJTM out of the goodness of his heart, aS a 
gift, with no agreed benefit in return. Rather, the parties negotiated and entered into a 51 
page Operating Agreement that carefully outlined all the rights and benefits each member 
was to receive, including the benefits Sieg was to receive based on his conveyance of the 
Property to MJTM. Sieg's benefits were further augmented when MJTM paid off the 
loan he owed which was encumbering the Property at the time he conveyed it to MJTM 
with the loan from Zions. Sieg did not pay the other members of MJTM as independent 
contractors. Rather, the Operating Agreement provided that the managers of MJT^i, 
including Sieg, were entitled to compensation from MJTM for their services as managefs, 
with initial annual compensation set at $25,000 each. R. at 143, Operating Agreement 
If 9.7. 
Also, Sieg argues that any promise he received from MJTM was illusory because 
MJTM did not guarantee profitability. Sieg attempts to distinguish the cases that hold 
that an otherwise illusory promise is enforceable because it includes an implied promise 
to use best efforts to accomplish the purpose of the agreement by stating, "[tjhis is not a 
case where a contracting party is trying to get out of a contract to the other's detriment." 
Appellee's Brief at 15. Contrary to Sieg's assertion, the cases holding that otherwise 
illusory promises are enforceable are applicable in this case because Sieg is trying to get 
out of his obligations under the Listing Agreement to Premier's detriment. Sieg has 
admitted that he breached the Listing Agreement when he conveyed the Property to 
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MJTM, see Appellee's Brief at 30, but he argues that he is not liable for Premier's agreed 
brokerage fee because the consideration he received from MJTM is illusory. 
Nonetheless, Sieg received valuable consideration and exactly what he bargained for. 
After over a year, Sieg determined that it was in his best interests to buy out the 
other members of MJTM, after the Property had been converted into a "bed and 
breakfast," and to sell the Property. See Appellant's Brief at 8-9, Tf 7. As discussed 
above, there was consideration for Sieg's conveyance of the Property to MJTM at the 
time the conveyance was made; after MJTM operated for over a year, after MJTM 
successfully converted the Property into a "bed and breakfast," after Sieg bought out the 
interests of the other members of MJTM, two for $30,000 each, and after the Property 
was sold, Sieg cannot now credibly claim lack of consideration for his original 
conveyance of the Property to MJTM because of the risk involved in the transaction in 
which he conveyed the Property to MJTM (which Sieg negotiated and entered into 
secretly and without any involvement of Premier), or because the Zions loan was not 
expressly outlined in the Operating Agreement. There was consideration for Sieg's 
conveyance of the Property to MJTM, and Premier is entitled to its agreed brokerage fee. 
II. SIEG'S CONVEYANCE OF THE PROPERTY TO MJTM WAS A "SALE" 
OR "EXCHANGE" UNDER THE EXCLUSIVE LISTING AGREEMENT 
BECAUSE SIEG TRANSFERRED THE PROPERTY TO A SEPARATE 
ENTITY AND RECEIVED A VALUABLE RECOMPENSE. 
In the Appellee's Brief, Sieg argues that his conveyance of the Property to MJTM 
did not involve a sale or exchange as contemplated in the Listing Agreement because the 
Operating Agreement characterized his conveyance of the Property as an investment of 
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capital. Appellee's Brief at 18-23. Acceptance of such an argument would provide a 
means for any seller of real property to avoid payment of an agreed brokerage fee. Iff a 
seller wished to avoid the obligation to pay a brokerage fee after entering into a binding 
exclusive listing agreement, the seller would simply need to create an L.L.C. with any 
interested potential purchasers, convey the property subject to the exclusive listing to the 
L.L.C, and characterize the conveyance as an investment, regardless of the rights granted 
in the L.L.C. operating agreement. The seller could even immediately sell his interest in 
the L.L.C, and still not be obligated to pay the agreed brokerage fee. Sie^'s 
characterization of his conveyance as an "investment" does not alter his obligation to pay 
Premier's brokerage fee. 
One of the older cases cited by Sieg in the Appellee's Brief quotes a long-standing 
definition of the expression "sale or exchange" in the context of a listing agreement: 
"When used together, the words 'sale or exchange' 
comprehend a 'transmutation of property from one man to 
another in consideration of some price or recompense in 
value.'" 2 Blackstone Comm. 446. 
The two basic elements of this definition are (1) a 
transfer of property from one person to another; and (2) a 
valuable recompense. To be classified as a sale or exchange 
the transaction must meet both of these tests. 
McElhinney v. Belsky, 165 Pa. Super. 546, 550-51, 69 A.2d 178, 180 (Pa. Super. <Dt. 
1949) (quoting Helvering v. Nebraska Bridge Supply & Lumber Co., 115 F.2d 228, 2^0 
(8th Cir. 1940)). 
Sieg has effectively conceded that his conveyance of the Property to MJTM wa$ a 
transfer of property from one person to another. See Appellee's Brief at 11-12 (U[A] sale 
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may take place by a transfer of property to a limited liability company. This point has 
been largely conceded by Mr. Sieg (See Salt Lake Knee & Sports Rehabilitation, Inc. v. 
Salt Lake City Knee & Sports Medicine, 909 P.2d 266 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) ....").5 The 
only issue is whether the transfer was for a valuable recompense, i.e. consideration, 
which, as discussed above, was present in this case as a matter of law. 
Sieg argues that his transfer could not have been a sale or exchange because the 
transfer was a risky investment rather than a sale. Appellee's Brief at 18-23. Sieg seems 
to be operating under the erroneous assumption that, if the consideration a seller receives 
for his conveyance of property involves risk, the conveyance is not a sale or exchange. If 
a seller chooses to accept consideration in exchange for a conveyance of property that 
involves risk, the conveyance is no less a sale or exchange than if the sale or exchange 
were for cash. For example, if a seller accepts a million shares of highly risky "penny 
stock" or any other type of risky investment in exchange for a conveyance of property, 
the transaction is a "sale or exchange." The existence of risk in connection with rights or 
property given in exchange does not preclude those rights or property from constituting 
consideration. Stated another way, the fact that consideration may increase or decrease in 
value over time does not change the fact that the consideration had value when given. 
As stated in the Appellant's Brief, it is well established in Utah that a broker is not 
an insurer of the performance of a contract or venture that a seller enters into. Bushnell 
5
 Sieg has steadily changed his theories of the case from his positions in the trial court. 
There, Sieg argued that his conveyance of the Property to MJTM could not be a sale or 
exchange because MJTM was not a separate entity, and Sieg in effect transferred the 
Property to himself. R. at 241-42, 295-301. 
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Real Estate, Inc. v. Nielson, 672 P.2d 746, 751 (Utah 1983); F.M.A. Fin. Corp. v. Build, 
Inc., 404 P.2d 670, 672 (Utah 1965) (Broker "cannot be held to be an insurer against the 
possibility that the buyer may become dissatisfied with his bargain and bring a lawsuit 
claiming the right of rescision [sic]."). A broker's right to a commission is based on t|ie 
valuable consideration received by the seller upon conveyance of the property. TJie 
possibility of a later increase or decrease in value of the consideration does not deprive 
the broker of his right to his brokerage fee. 
If a seller bargains for and receives valuable consideration for a conveyance of 
property, the transaction constitutes a sale or exchange. Sieg received valuable 
consideration. His conveyance of the Property to MJTM constituted a sale or exchange 
and obligated Sieg to pay the brokerage fee agreed in the Listing Agreement. 
Sieg cites Dahdah v. Continent Realty, Inc., 434 So.2d 997 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1983), Miller, Cowherd & Kerver, Inc. v. De Montejo, 406 So.2d 1196 (Fla. Dist. (tt. 
App. 1981), and Cooley Inv. Co. v. Jones, 780 P.2d 29 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989), and evpn 
attaches copies of these cases to the Appellee's Brief. As stated by the Hagan court, 
the cases relied on by Hagan [just as by Sieg] for the 
proposition that the contribution of property to a limited 
liability company is not a sale but the capitalization of a new 
company are inapposite. Those cases involved the 
capitalization of a partnership or entity governed by 
partnership law. As noted in those cases, a partnership is not 
an entity separate from the partners themselves; thus, in such 
circumstances, there is no transfer of property from one 
person to another, but only a change in the form of 
ownership. Southpace ["Properties, Inc. v. Acquisition 
Group], 5 F.3d [500,] at 504 [(11th Cir. 1993)]; Cooley, 780 
P.2d at 31; De Montejo, 406 So. 2d at 1198; McElhinney, 69 
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Sieg argues that he has no viable cause of action against MJTM, because it had no 
assets other than those he contributed. Appellee's Brief at 26. Again, Sieg misstates the 
facts. It is undisputed that MJTM converted the Property into a "bed and breakfast" 
utilizing funds it borrowed from Zions, not funds that were contributed by Sieg. All the 
members of MJTM guaranteed that loan, not just Sieg. 
The reason that Sieg has no viable cause of action against MJTM is because Sieg 
received from MJTM what he bargained for. MJTM's purpose as stated in the Operating 
Agreement was to renovate the Property into a first rate "bed and breakfast," and then to 
operate it for a profit. MJTM successfully converted the Property into a first rate "bed 
and breakfast," but prior to the time that MJTM could operate the Property for a profit as 
a "bed and breakfast," Sieg bought out the other members of MJTM, two for $30,000 
each, dissolved the L.L.C., and sold the Property to the Malones. Sieg can no more sue 
MJTM for breach of an unfulfilled obligation than Sieg can credibly deny his obligation 
to pay Premier its brokerage fee given that he conveyed the Property to MJTM in a 
bargained for exchange and received what he bargained for. 
IV. MJTM'S ACQUISITION PRICE ON WHICH PREMIER'S BROKERAGE 
FEE IS BASED IS DEFINED IN THE OPERATING AGREEMENT. 
The Listing Agreement obligated Sieg to pay to Premier a brokerage fee of sevra 
percent of the acquisition price plus $250. The parties to the Operating Agreement 
agreed in writing that the value of the Property that MJTM was acquiring from Sieg was 
$1.3 million. R. at 93-94; 173. In Sieg's Opposition Memo, Sieg admitted that tjie 
agreed value of the Property in the transaction with MJTM was $1.3 million, and Sieg did 
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not dispute that the 7% brokerage fee is appropriately calculated using that agreed value. 
See R. at 237. 
Now for the first time, in a desperate attempt to avoid his liability under the 
Listing Agreement, Sieg argues that, "[m]erely because the [Property was valued at $1.3 
million does not mean that MJTM purchased it at that amount. Premier would have to 
show that Mr. Sieg received value of $1.3 million to prevail on its theory, or point to 
some other acquisition price supported by credible evidence, which Premier has not even 
attempted." Appellee's Brief at 28. Given that Sieg has raised this issue for the first time 
on appeal, the Court should decline consideration of this issue. See Ong Int'l (U.S.A.) 
Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 455 (Utah 1993). The Court should remand this 
case to the trial court with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Premier for $91,000 
(the $1,300,000 value of the Property provided in the Operating Agreement times 7%) 
plus $250, plus prejudgment interest, costs and attorneys' fees. 
6
 In the event that this Court considers this argument raised for the first time on 
appeal, the Hagan case provides a model which this Court can follow to award Premier 
its brokerage fee without relying solely on the agreed value of the Property, as shown in 
the Operating Agreement. Sieg cites the Hagan case as an example of an appropriate 
valuation of the acquisition price for purposes of determining an appropriate brokerage 
fee in a case with similar facts. The Hagan court does not indicate whether or not the 
parties to the L.L.C. agreement in that case had agreed on a value for the property the 
L.L.C. was acquiring as occurred in this case. The Hagan court determined the 
appropriate amount of the brokerage fee based on the amount of debt that the L.L.C. 
assumed, plus the face amount of the note that Hagan received from the L.L.C, secured 
by a second deed of trust on the property Hagan conveyed to the L.L.C. See Hagan, 253 
Va. at 220-21, 482 S.E.2d at 807-08. 
In the Operating Agreement, MJTM agreed to assume $580,000 in debt owed by 
Sieg, $300,000 of which was paid off with the new loan acquired by MJTM from Zions. 
Further, as discussed above, MJTM promised not to mortgage or encumber the Property 
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In Appellee's Brief, Sieg acknowledges that he breached the Listing Agreement. 
Appellee's Brief at 30-31. Sieg argues that he breached the Listing Agreement by 
removing the Property from the market prior to the term of the Listing Agreement. Id. 
Premier agrees that Sieg breached the Listing Agreement by conveying the Property to 
MJTM. But the conveyance to MJTM was a sale or exchange, not just a removal of the 
Property from the market. As the Court can see, Premier did plead a claim for breach Df 
the Listing Agreement. Premier's damages are its agreed brokerage fee based on tne 
without Sieg's consent until after Sieg had received a return of his initial capital 
contribution. If MJTM were "dissolved for any reason prior to becoming profitable, Mr. 
Sieg's capital contribution would be returned to him undisturbed by any interest of the 
other members of MJTM." Appellee's Brief at 7, Tf 8. 
Accordingly, MJTM was obligated to repay Sieg's agreed initial capital 
contribution of $670,000, and that repayment obligation was secured by a negative 
pledge of the Property. Although a negative pledge lacks certain of the enforcement 
mechanisms of a trust deed, the second deed of trust note in Hagan was only due when 
the property conveyed to the L.L.C. by Hagan was subsequently sold, and so those 
enforcement mechanisms would only have been available at that time. In light of the 
limited enforcement mechanisms available to Hagan in the context of the operations of 
the L.L.C, the negative pledge of the Property to secure MJTM's obligation to repay 
Sieg's initial capital contribution was the functional equivalent of the second trust deed 
given to Hagan to secure the L.L.C.'s payment obligation in that case. 
Utilizing the valuation analysis from the Hagan case, Sieg's obligation to pay 
Premier's brokerage fee would be based on the debt assumed by MJTM of $580,000 plus 
MJTM's obligation to repay Sieg's agreed initial capital contribution of $670,000 secured 
by MJTM's negative pledge on the Property, for a total acquisition price of $1,250,000, 
rather than the value agreed in the Operating Agreement of $1,300,000. Cf. R. at 237, 
Opposition Memo ^ 5 ("Mr. Sieg's capital contribution was considered to be $670,000, 
with the agreed upon value of the contributed [PJroperty to be 1.3 million dollars, with 
MJTM assuming an amount equal to $580,000 in prior encumbrances. Depo. Exhibit 12. 
The overage of $50,000 remains unexplained."). If the Court chooses to consider this 
argument, the Court can still remand for entry of judgment in favor of Premier in the 
amount of $87,500 ($1,250,000 times 7% rather than $91,000 - or $1,300,000 times 7% 
— as previously requested) plus $250, plus prejudgment interest, costs and attorneys' 
fees. 
432242 1 22 
value of the Property acquired by MJTM as stated in the Operating Agreement of $1.3 
million times 7% plus $250, as provided in the Listing Agreement. The Court should 
reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for entry of judgment in favor of 
Premier for Sieg's breach. 
V. AS THE APPROPRIATELY PREVAILING PARTY, PREMIER IS 
ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ITS REASONABLE ATTORNEYS' FEES 
AT THE TRIAL COURT LEVEL AND ON APPEAL, OR AT MINIMUM 
THE COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF 
ATTORNEYS' FEES. 
There is no dispute that the properly prevailing party is entitled to an award of its 
reasonable attorneys' fees incurred herein. As already discussed, when the Court 
reverses the judgment of the trial court and remands for entry of judgment in favor of 
Premier, the Court should also order the trial court to determine and award reasonable 
attorneys' fees incurred by Premier, both at the trial court level and on appeal. 
A review of the Appellee's Brief reveals that, in the unlikely event that this Court 
affirms the grant of summary judgment in favor of Sieg, the Court should nonetheless 
reverse the trial court's grant of attorneys' fees. Sieg acknowledges that he did not 
satisfy the dictates of Rule 4-505(1) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. 
Appellee's Brief at 32. Nonetheless, Sieg argues that he provided enough information to 
7
 Sieg not only acknowledges that he failed to present an affidavit that satisfied the 
dictates of Rule 4-505(1), but he also states that the affidavit Premier filed strictly 
complied with the Rule. In a somewhat strange argument, Sieg argues that, because 
Premier satisfied the dictates of Rule 4-505(1), and attached time sheets to the affidavit 
that clearly set forth the nature of the work done by Premier's attorneys, Sieg should be 
excused from complying with Rule 4-505(1). See Appellee's Brief at 32, n.6. But the 
trial court's assessment of the reasonableness of an attorneys' fees award is based on a 
review of the legal work done for the party requesting the award, utilizing the evidence 
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the trial court for the trial court to determine the reasonableness of the requested 
attorneys' fee award. Id. at 32-33. 
Satisfaction of the requirements of Rule 4-505(1) is mandatory, not permissive, for 
those seeking an award of attorneys' fees from a Utah state trial court. Rule 4-505 states 
that it "shall govern the award of attorney fees in the trial courts." (emphasis addecj). 
Rule 4-505(1) provides that "[affidavits in support of an award of attorney fees must be 
filed with the court and set forth specifically the legal basis for the award, the nature of 
the work performed by the attorney, the number of hours spent to prosecute the claim o^ 
judgment, or the time spent in pursuing the matter to the stage for which attorney fees are 
claimed, and affirm the reasonableness of the fees for comparable legal service^." 
(emphasis added). 
Although a trial court has discretion to determine an award of 
attorney fees, the exercise of that discretion must be based on 
an evaluation of the evidence. See Dixie State Bank v. 
Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 991 (Utah 1988). When the evidence 
presented is insufficient, the couifs evaluation of those fees 
will also be insufficient. 
Cottonwood Mall v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266, 269 (Utah 1992). 
The trial court abused its discretion and its evaluation was insufficient when tjie 
trial court awarded Sieg attorneys' fees without requiring Sieg to present at least the 
minimum mandatory evidence dictated by Rule 4-505(1). Sieg argues that, "[a]t 
minimum, this [C]ourt should affirm the award of attorney fees and remand for a mc^ re 
— — — _ __ _ — _ — . — i — 
mandated by Rule 4-505; the assessment cannot be based on a comparison with work 
done by counsel for the opposing party without a review of the work done for the 
requesting party utilizing the evidence required by Rule 4-505. 
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thorough determination of a reasonable amount of attorney fees." Appellee's Brief at 34. 
After Sieg filed the Affidavit for Attorney Fees, Premier filed its Objection to 
Defendant's Affidavit for Attorney Fees, in which Premier pointed out that the Affidavit 
for Attorney Fees did not satisfy the requirements of Rule 4-505(1). R. at 341-43. Sieg 
chose not to file a supplemental affidavit to satisfy the dictates of the Rule. See R. at 
356-58. Sieg should not now be given the opportunity to file a supplemental affidavit 
when he chose not to file one at the appropriate time. 
In the event the Court affirms the summary judgment in favor of Sieg, the Court 
should at minimum reverse the trial court's award of attorneys' fees. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court's October 6, 2000 Order, as supplemented by its December 7, 
2000 Minute Entry should be reversed. This Court should remand the case to the district 
court with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Premier and against Sieg for 
$91,250, plus prejudgment interest at 10% from January 21, 1998 until judgment is 
entered, plus Premier's reasonable costs and attorneys' fees both in the district court and 
on appeal, in an amount to be determined by the district court. 
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